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The purpose of this research is to determine the applicability of Navy Working Capital 
Fund repairable inventory on small combatant platforms. The majority of these platforms 
are funded, as of June 2013, using appropriated Operating Target funds. This project 
analyzes NWCF versus end-use funded inventories using data from the pilot project 
launched by Commander Naval Surface Forces East on USS Normandy (CG 60) in 2008. 
We use supply effectiveness and financial data to identify if there is an inventory 
readiness gap between the two sources of funding, and compare and contrast performance 
with other CNSF Guided Missile Cruiser and Amphibious Assault class ships. From this 
analysis, we identify the advantages and disadvantages of both NWCF and end-use 
inventories and provide an impact matrix for the three major stakeholders: the ship, the 
Type Commander, and the Navy. We also provide a recommendation to Naval Supply 
Systems Command on the future implementation of these methods for existing and future 
classes of small combatants, specifically, Zumwalt-class destroyers. 
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This project reviews the two different funding methods for spare parts support on 
U.S. Navy ships, Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) and end-use funding. As Navy 
Supply Officers, we entered into this project with experience managing both types of 
inventories on multiple classes of ships. Our professional knowledge and experience 
shaped the development of our hypotheses and guided us in the selection of data we used 
to analyze this complex issue. The question of whether the Navy should use one funding 
method over another has deeply rooted cultural and organizational ideologies that will 
compel decision-makers to identify their inventory measures of success. As the Navy 
acquires and resources new classes of ships, develops IT systems, and faces fiscal 
challenges, we assert that shipboard inventory management metrics will require a broader 
view. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States Navy employs two funding methods to provision and replenish 
spare parts inventories onboard ships: Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) and end-use 
funding. Traditionally, the class of ship has determined the type of inventory funding 
method used. For example, NWCF inventory is placed aboard large ships, such as aircraft 
carriers (CVNs) and amphibious assault ships (LHDs). Conversely, inventories on small 
combatants, such as guided missile cruisers (CGs) and guided missile destroyers (DDGs), 
are end-use funded. Our research looks at these two inventory funding methods and their 
impact on a ship’s supply readiness, repairable parts funding, and inventory management. 
1. Inventory–Wholesale vs. Retail 
The wholesale-versus-retail concept is similar in form for both commercial and 
military environments but differs significantly in performance expectations. Wherein the 




objectives focus on the operational availability of the weapons system supported by the 
inventory. 
Textbook definitions of commercial and retail wholesale inventories are as 
follows:  
[Wholesale:] The wholesaler purchases large quantities from 
manufacturers and sells small quantities to retailers in order to provide 
retail customers with assorted merchandise from different manufacturers 
in smaller quantities. (Ailawadi, 2005, p. 73) 
[Retail:] Retailer purchases a wide variety of products and in relatively 
smaller quantities and assumes a substantial risk in [the] marketing 
process. Retailer inventory risk is wide but not deep. Emphasis is more on 
inventory turnover. (Ailawadi, 2005, p. 73) 
Military wholesale, retail, and consumer inventories are described by the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) as follows: 
Wholesale Level Inventory. The highest level of organized DoD 
[Department of Defense] supply, and as such, procures, repairs, and 
maintains stocks to resupply the retail levels of supply. Inventory for 
which the designated inventory manager has asset visibility at the national 
level and exercises unrestricted asset control to meet worldwide inventory 
management responsibilities. (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2012, p. 
9) 
Retail Level Inventory. Inventory, regardless of the funding source, held 
below the wholesale level. The retail level is made up of intermediate and 
consumer level inventory. (CNO, 2012, p. 9) 
Consumer Level Inventory. The part of the retail inventory, regardless of 
funding source, usually of limited supply distribution for the sole purpose 
of internal consumption or utilization. (CNO, 2012, p. 9) 
Small combatants such as CGs and DDGs carry and own a consumer retail 
inventory. LHDs and CVNs also carry a retail inventory, with the caveat that the 
inventory is retained and utilized by the ship but owned by the wholesale organization 
until the ship purchases the spare part for use. The CG’s inventory is managed by end-use 




2. NWCF vs. End-Use Funding 
The Navy has been using capital funding, in the form of stock funds, for materiel 
procurement since the late 1800s. Today’s NWCF descends from the 1947 National 
Security Act, which called for the use of revolving funds as the business model for 
commercial-type activities, such as material procurement for Navy customers 
(Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, 2001). The purpose of a revolving 
fund is two-fold, to promote total cost visibility and to control those costs. “The basic 
tenet of the revolving fund structure is to provide a customer–provider relationship 
between the military operating units and support organizations” (Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service, 2011). The flow of funding for the NWCF begins at the fund’s 
inception with an initial appropriation from Congress. Revolving funds are intended to be 
self-sustaining and operate on a break-even basis, as opposed to for-profit. This makes 
them useful tools to both government entities and non-profit organizations, which are 
providing goods and services at the taxpayer or donor’s expense (Department of the 
Navy, Office of Financial Management and Budget, 2010). For example, Congress may 
appropriate $1 million to the NWCF. Ten types of widgets are purchased with NWCF 
money and warehoused by the Navy. The Navy sets the retail price of the widget to 
include the cost of the part plus overhead, such as storage, transportation, and handling. A 
ship orders the part, and the NWCF is reimbursed; overhead costs are paid, and a new 
part is ordered for the warehouse. The intent is to break even, and any gains or losses in 
the system are recovered by adjusting the retail price. Figure 1 provides a basic 





Figure 1.  Process Diagram: Defense Working Capital Funds (From DAU, 2011) 
NWCF assets include cash and physical assets, such as parts. CVN and LHD 
inventories, for example, are assets of the NWCF. In essence, each of these ships is a 
floating supply depot for the Navy; the majority of stock is not owned by the individual 
ships and is not available for ship’s use until its Operating Target (OPTAR) funds are 
available and obligated. Each ship maintains its own OPTAR “to obtain the material and 
services necessary for day-to-day operations” (Commander, Naval Supply Systems 
Command [NAVSUP], 1997, §9000). The OPTAR represents the necessary fiscal year 
funding authority granted from the type commander by way of the fleet commander, 
Navy comptroller, and ultimately, Congress, as a result of the annual federal budget 
process. The NWCF is reimbursed by the ship’s OPTAR funding when the customer (i.e., 
shipboard supply department) requisitions the inventory item from the storeroom. At that 




Conversely, the availability of OPTAR funding (end-use) is required upfront to 
replenish inventories on smaller combatants such as CGs and DDGs. Spare parts are paid 
for as they are ordered from the Navy supply system. Again, Figure 2 provides an 
abbreviated representation of the end-use process and the flow of funding and materiel. 
Unlike the NWCF process described in Figure 1, the ship does not pay into a revolving 
fund. Instead, the ship provides the payment in the form of an obligation to the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). DFAS then plays the role of banker by 
matching and reconciling the customers’ obligations with the providers’ expenditures. 
 
Figure 2.  Process Diagram: End-Use Funds 
The process begins when a ship’s stock control division submits a requisition to 
the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC), a shore-based primary contact point for materiel 
support. There are FLCs in fleet concentration areas worldwide that maintain inventories 




requisition to Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Weapons Systems Support 
(WSS) in Mechanicsburg, PA. Here, personnel called Item Managers, who are assigned 
to particular stock items, identify a location where the part is available and refer the 
requisition to be filled (NAVSUP, 1997, §1072). Once the part arrives, it is received into 
the ship’s inventory for future use. The ship owns the part, and it is considered an asset of 
the ship’s Type Commander (TYCOM). 
Therefore, NWCF inventories are often perceived to provide an advantage to the 
end-user by allowing immediate stock replenishment for the storeroom regardless of 
available OPTAR funding from the TYCOM. 
3. Supply Readiness 
Spare parts inventories on Navy ships vary with respect to the size of the ship and 
the number and type of weapons systems maintained onboard. For example, a CG may 
have approximately 12,000 inventory line items, while an LHD may have approximately 
25,000 inventory line items. The Navy uses a measurement, called supply effectiveness, 
to evaluate the supply department’s ability to satisfy materiel requests from its onboard 
stock. As such, supply effectiveness is an indicator of supply department readiness and a 
critical input into the ship’s overall readiness. Regardless of whether the stock is funded 
through the NWCF or end-use funding method, the measurement requirement is the 
same. Therefore, we use supply effectiveness to show whether there is a readiness 
advantage gained by the use of one funding method over the other. 
C. PURPOSE 
In August 2008, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CNSF–
East), launched an inventory pilot project on a Norfolk-based guided missile cruiser, USS 
Normandy (CG 60), to test the feasibility of NWCF inventory on small combatants. 
CNSF–East is the TYCOM for all naval surface ships based on the East Coast. In 
partnership with Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNSF–West), the 
TYCOM controls and provides resources to ships during the training cycles prior to 




method of Normandy’s repair parts inventory from end-use ownership to NWCF. That is, 
NAVSUP assumed ownership of Normandy’s inventory from CNSF–East. To illustrate 
this concept, consider an auto parts supplier that provides Acme Auto Repair Shop with 
spare parts the supplier knows Acme will most likely use for its business. Acme pays for 
the parts as they are used for auto repairs, while the supplier retains ownership of the 
stock. In this case, Normandy is Acme, and the supplier is NAVSUP. 
In late 2012, NAVSUP requested that supply readiness and financial data from 
Normandy’s pilot project be evaluated. The results of the project would be used as a 
factor in determining the inventory sourcing method for the new Zumwalt-class 
destroyers (DDG 1000). We surmised that the results could also be used to determine a 
future course of action for existing classes of ships that utilize the end-use inventory 
funding method. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the supply effectiveness and OPTAR 
data of Normandy and compare the data to a sample of ships to address the following 
research questions: 
 Does a readiness or financial benefit exist when using a NWCF inventory 
method instead of an end-use inventory method? How does it affect the 
Navy, TYCOM, and individual unit? 
 Should current end-use inventory platforms change to the NWCF 
inventory method? 
 Is the NWCF inventory method a better option to use on future platforms 
that would traditionally fit the end-use funding method? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this project is limited to the evaluation of supply effectiveness and 
OPTAR data provided by CNSF for Normandy, CGs, and LHDs with the following 
parameters: 
 Supply effectiveness measurements of Normandy both before and after the 




 Supply effectiveness measurements of all CGs and East Coast LHDs. 
 OPTAR obligations of all CGs and all LHDs during the NWCF period. 
Financial obligations prior to 2008 were not available. 
This project does not evaluate Normandy or the other ships used in the research 
for total materiel readiness, which would include data on shipboard maintenance and 
weapons system status, both of which are classified. It does not measure the quality of the 
inventory (i.e., spares that could be carried in the inventory based on recorded demand 
but are not). We present the supply effectiveness data reported by the ships to the 
TYCOM as an accurate reflection of their supply readiness for the reporting period. 
However, we accept that these numbers are vulnerable to manipulation by shipboard 
personnel in an effort to report higher effectiveness numbers, though we acknowledge 
this practice is the exception, not the rule. Last, we use repairable OPTAR obligations in 
lieu of total OPTAR obligations that contain operating expenses and purchases that do 
not apply to this research. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
In this chapter, we provided an overview of NWCF and end-use inventory 
funding methods, as well as introduced the Normandy pilot project as the genesis of our 
research. Chapter II examines prior research of the NWCF versus end-use question. It 
provides a literary foundation for commercial inventory practices and measurement 
techniques that parallel the Navy’s. Chapter III defines the data sources and 
measurements used in the analysis. The methodology of the research, which focuses on 
inventory effectiveness and financial measurement, is detailed in Chapter IV. 
Additionally, that chapter describes the hypothesis tests used in the data analysis chapter 
and discusses our assumptions. Chapter V analyzes the CNSF data for Normandy, along 
with the research population of ships, and illustrates the results. The final chapter 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For this research, we used a broad range of resources to bring the reader into the 
conversation of inventory funding methods. In the following sections, we provide an 
overview of the resources that provided insight on working capital and direct 
appropriation methods and inventory performance measures, as well as the existing 
comparative analysis of these two funding methods. We close this section by highlighting 
the data and supplemental documents we received for Normandy’s pilot project. 
A. REVOLVING FUNDS 
There is extensive reference material available on the topic of revolving funds. 
Merriam-Webster’s online defines revolving funds as those “set up for specified purposes 
with the proviso that repayments to the fund may be used again for these purposes” 
(Revolving Fund, 2013). These funds are commonly used for environmental initiatives, 
prescription drug funds, historical or preservation societies, and government agencies. 
Our first resource provided a recent and succinct overview of revolving funds and 
their characteristics, one of the most significant being that “all income is derived from the 
activity’s operations and is available to finance continuing operations without a fiscal 
year limitation” (Jones, Candreva, & DeVore, 2012, p. 265). This concept is integral as 
we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the funding methods. A working capital 
fund model discourages the acquire-and-spend (“use it or lose it”) mentality that is 
encouraged in an end-use model (Jones et al., 2012). The resource also addressed the 
customer–provider relationship, a theme consistently reiterated throughout the research 
literature and relevant to this research topic. 
In 1991, the Department of Defense (DoD) combined all of its stock and 
industrial funds into one fund called the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF), the 
precursor to today’s working capital funds. Patricia E. Byrnes (1993) discussed the 
origination, purpose, and evolution of those working capital funds, of which the DBOF 




repairable parts inventory before and after revolving funds. Before revolving funds, 
repairable parts were purchased with supplier appropriation funding, wherein after 
revolving funds, customer operation and maintenance money was used (Byrnes, 1993). 
She also described the differences that exist in managing these funds and the supplier–
customer relationships that result, presenting the parallel of the DBOF to the commercial 
sector: 
DBOF is intended to improve the operation of stock-funded, industrial 
funded, and some support activities through improved customer–supplier 
relationships. On the customer (buyer) side the focus of DBOF is to ensure 
that the customer drives the requirements. This is accomplished by 
shifting all funding to the customer. In addition, pricing will be established 
based on the cost of delivery of the service. … On the provider (seller) 
side the goals of DBOF are to ensure that prices reflect performance and 
are stable (e.g., unit cost pricing), funding is based on customer demand, 
and that costs are managed through established performance objectives. 
(Byrnes, 1993, p. 10) 
Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department 
Financial Manager (Potvin, 2012) takes the reader through both the federal and DoD 
budget process, resource allocation of funds, funding mechanisms such as reimbursable 
and revolving funds, and the flow of appropriations to the end-user. Here, the source of 
what this research refers to as end-use funding is explained in detail, from the originating 
bill in Congress to the Navy’s operations and maintenance (O&MN) funding that is 
allocated to a ship’s commanding officer and managed by the shipboard supply officer. 
The author, like Byrnes, reminded us of one of the primary principles of the working 
capital fund: the customer–provider relationship–in this case as it relates to budget 
formulation. “Customers discuss their projected workload with providers, and the 
providers project estimated rates based on the projected workload” (Potvin, 2012, p. 122). 
The operating portion of the working capital budget consists of direct, indirect, and 
administrative costs, while the capital portion of the budget provides for capital 
investments and improvements of $250,000 or greater and a useful life of two years or 




research, this concept is discussed as a cost consideration of capitalizing the spare parts 
inventory on existing and future naval vessels. 
B. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
This research examines the correlation between inventory management and 
performance measurement on Navy ships. Previous research on inventory management 
for the DoD and the DoN has been limited and mainly focused on the size and efficiency 
of service-wide or fleet inventory levels and their associated performance measurements. 
Conversely, a great deal of research has been performed in the area of commercial 
inventory models and sustainment practices. There are multiple supply chain and 
inventory management textbooks, websites, and research papers that discuss the basic 
principles of inventory. This research narrows the conversation down to the concept of 
wholesale and retail inventory management, wherein the following publications were 
used to provide a foundation and guide the conversation of funding shipboard 
inventories. 
The primary references for wholesale and retail inventory definitions and 
shipboard inventory effectiveness measurements are the DoD Supply Chain Materiel 
Management Regulation (Department of Defense, 2003) and the DoN’s Retail Supply 
Support of Naval Activities and Operating Forces (CNO, 2012). These publications lay 
the foundation for NAVSUP and TYCOM inventory and funding guidance used by 
shipboard supply departments. Detailed descriptions of these publications are provided in 
Appendix B. These references are the roadmap to defining the fleet’s inventory 
management procedures, measurement, and performance goals. Like travelers embarking 
on a quest, we began our evaluation of shipboard inventory management by studying this 
map. 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Defense Inventory: 
Opportunities Exist to Improve Spare Parts Support aboard Deployed Navy Ships (2003), 
provided a comprehensive review of supply effectiveness for six battle groups deployed 




Navy is meeting its spare parts supply goals, (2) the reasons for any unmet supply goals, 
and (3) the effects of spare parts supply problems on ship operations, mission readiness, 
and costs” (GAO, 2003, p. 1). The makeup of the carrier battle group in 1999 and 2000 
was typically one aircraft carrier, one auxiliary supply ship, two cruisers, two destroyers, 
and one frigate. The aircraft carrier and the auxiliary ship inventories were NWCF; the 
remainder of the ships retained an end-use funded inventory. The data for total supply 
effectiveness, which they measured as the percentage of requisitions filled from onboard 
inventories, ranged from 51 to 61% for the different battle groups. This amounted to an 
average of 54% for all six groups, falling below the Navy’s goal of 65% (GAO, 2003). 
The report also analyzed data for Pacific Fleet amphibious readiness groups, whose 
composition included an LHD with a NWCF inventory and smaller support ships with 
end-use inventories. The average supply effectiveness rate of these ships was also 54 % 
for the same time period (GAO, 2003). Though the data for this report was collected in 
1999 and 2000, the following excerpt reveals that this issue has a long history: 
These supply rates for the deployed battle groups are consistent with 
fleetwide historical data available from Navy reports. These data show 
that from 1982 to 2000 Navy ships in both deployed and nondeployed 
status, were, on average, able to fill 55 percent of their parts requisitions 
from onboard inventories. These rates have not varied much over the past 
20 years, indicating that little overall progress has been made in meeting 
the Navy’s 65 percent goal. (GAO, 2003, p. 7) 
Although this report did not correlate the funding method of the inventory to the 
effectiveness measurement, it establishes a significant baseline for supply effectiveness 
rates onboard a variety of surface ships that utilize both types of funding. The study cited 
inaccurate ship configuration records and incomplete, erroneous, or outdated historical 
demand data as key contributors to the low effectiveness rates. To date, this is the most 
comprehensive published study measuring spare parts support and availability on 
multiple classes of surface ships. 
Thorne examined the impact of performance measures and material availability 
(1999). He found that high inventory levels were the result of outdated performance 




their superiors. This may lead to inventory levels that are not reflective of the ship’s 
actual requirements but rather a stockpiling of some material and a deficiency in others. 
Likewise, this project discusses the concept of inventory levels in relation to supply 
effectiveness measurements and seeks to answer the question, “Do different types of 
inventory buy a higher level of performance?” 
Another aspect of inventory management is the relationship between its 
associated performance measurements (supply effectiveness) and the reporting culture 
and incentives placed on these measurements. The aforementioned GAO report (2003) 
inadvertently highlighted the shipboard supply system’s vulnerability to manipulation. In 
a table illustrating the percentage of requisitions filled by onboard stocks for six ships in 
the Lincoln Battle Group, the following footnote was made for one of the CGs: 
The [CG] data overstate the number of onboard requisitions filled because 
the ship filed 452 individual requisitions for bulk issue items (light bulbs) 
that should have been included on a smaller number of requisitions for 
larger quantities, according to type command supply officials. (GAO, 
2003, p. 17) 
The cultural desire to reach the requisite readiness goals has made this is a fairly 
common practice on Navy ships. CNSF’s supply procedures publication also illustrates 
the vulnerability of the system and provides stern guidance on this type of practice: 
There are times when a CMP pulse point area will be yellow or red, even 
though the ship has taken all appropriate action. Further action to 
manipulate data (i.e., “Gaming”) to make a CMP pulse point green will 
not be tolerated and may negatively impact the ship’s departmental award 
(i.e., Blue E) and/or SMC grade. For example … issuing light bulbs one at 
a time to improve effectiveness numbers [is an example] of gaming. 
(Commander, Naval Surface Force [CNSF], 2008, §17501.h) 
In his thesis, Thorne (1999) also spoke to culture and the pressure on commands 
to ensure the highest level of weapons systems readiness. He examined the impact of 
performance measures and material availability. He found that high inventory levels were 
the result of outdated performance measures, which in turn created an incentive for users 
to overstate readiness measurements for their superiors. This may lead to inventory levels 




material. Likewise, this project discussed the concept of inventory in relation to supply 
effectiveness measurements. 
C. COMPARATIVE WORK 
There are no current academic or professional publications analyzing the specific 
issue of inventory funding methods on Navy ships. The most recent research addresses 
the industrial fund component of the NWCF, as opposed to the stock fund, and compares 
and contrasts the use of NWCF versus end-use funding to operate naval shipyards. The 
two applicable works we reviewed were an MBA thesis from the Naval Postgraduate 
School written in 2006 and a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report published in 
2007. 
The thesis, Comparison of the Navy Working Capital Fund and Mission Funding 
as Applied to Navy Shipyards (Cain, 2006), evaluated the Navy’s decision to transition 
the four naval shipyards from NWCF to end-use funding (referred to as mission funding 
in the author’s research). The thesis analyzed the “advantages and disadvantages each 
financial system provides shipyards, the operating differences that occur due to the 
funding change, and the future financial consequences of funding Navy shipyards using 
direct appropriations” (Cain, 2006, Abstract, p. V). The factors used to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the funding method were cost visibility and flexibility–both 
operational and financial. Similarly, our research looks at inventory funding from the 
flexibility viewpoint. We do not address cost visibility since it was not of concern in 
addressing the question of whether one inventory method provides a higher level of 
supply readiness. However, flexibility provided by one inventory method over another 
was a key concept to answering this question. 
Cain determined that in the area of operational and financial flexibility, there was 
no overwhelming advantage or disadvantage provided by the mission-funded model 
versus the NWCF model, therefore making it a draw. He determined that in the area of 
operational flexibility, “mission funded shipyards have more financial flexibility when 




argued that overall, “NWCF shipyards, in and of themselves, maintain significant 
financial freedom compared to MF [Mission Funded]. They are bound by none of the 
fiscal year requirements MF organizations must adhere to, and face no spending 
uncertainty during appropriations delays” (Cain, 2006, p. 56). While it would seem by 
this statement NWCF won the point, the author minimized this advantage in his 
conclusion. The overall analysis provides that there are several variables, aside from 
funding, that determine the effectiveness of operations at naval shipyards. This statement 
can also be made of the funding method of shipboard inventories, wherein our research 
also highlights the additional variables that make an impact on supply readiness. The 
author’s final recommendation found mission funding to be overall more advantageous 
with few drawbacks and supported the continued use of mission funding at Pearl Harbor 
and Puget Sound naval shipyards, as well as the planned conversion of Norfolk and 
Portsmouth naval shipyards. 
The CBO paper, Comparing Working-Capital Funding and Mission Funding for 
Naval Shipyards (2007), took a deeper look at the problem, utilizing additional metrics 
from Cain’s (2006) analysis to determine a difference in capital expenditures and 
operational performance (CBO, 2007). With regard to operational flexibility, both 
authors concurred that mission funding (end-use) provided an overall advantage in 
workforce and workload, because the Navy has more control in a mission-funded 
environment to align the shipyard’s workload to its own requirements (CBO, 2007). As a 
result of the conversion from NWCF to mission funding, the shipyard fell under the 
authority of the yard’s primary customer (the fleet), rather than the organization that had 
technical cognizance over the repairs and modernization. The comparison we can draw 
from this funding method used on Navy ships is the following: The end-use funded ship 
“owns” the onboard spares inventory, which ultimately belongs to the TYCOM, who 
provides the OPTAR; whereas the NWCF inventory is owned by NAVSUP while it is in 
the storeroom; permission is required to transfer the asset to a non-NWCF command. 




Another area both the CBO paper and our research explored was operational 
performance measures. CBO chose a set of existing measurements that they believed 
would provide an objective comparison of the shipyard’s performance both before and 
after the transition from NWCF to mission (end-use) funding. These measurements were 
schedule adherence, total annual costs, cost per ship availability, burdened labor rate, and 
administrative efficiency. These metrics were inconclusive in providing a link between a 
shipyard’s funding mechanism and its operational performance (CBO, 2007). Our 
research uses gross and net supply effectiveness, deficiency to requisitioning objective, 
and repairable financial expenditure metrics to compare the two funding methods. In the 
end, the CBO report was not able to make a succinct determination of which of the two 
funding methods was superior. They highlighted strengths and weaknesses of both, but 
did not support or challenge the Navy’s decision to convert the four naval shipyards from 
NWCF to mission funding. 
D. USS NORMANDY PILOT PROJECT 
In addition to the supply effectiveness and financial data provided by CNSF for 
Normandy’s pilot project, we also had access to CNSF point papers that outlined 
conversion details both before and after the pilot project. We reviewed lessons learned 
provided by CNSF–East and those shipboard supply officers assigned to Normandy 
before, during, and after conversion. We used these documents as supplemental 







Before describing our data sources and collection process, we first provide 
background on spare parts and allowances, supply effectiveness measures, and operating 
funds. 
1. Spare Parts and Allowances 
a. Repairables 
Repair parts are those components that due to their complexity, cost, or 
scarcity must be returned to the depot for repair once the part fails; therefore, they are 
referred to as Depot Level Repairables (DLR). Field Level Repairables (FLR) are a lesser 
variant of the DLR. It is economically more feasible for the Navy to repair these assets 
rather than pay the full replacement cost. The DLR program is funded through the NWCF 
as a stock fund activity. Unlike the NWCF’s industrial fund that requires the customer to 
obligate funding before the activity can incur expenses, the stock fund permits the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and NAVSUP WSS to “incur obligations in 
anticipation of customer demand based on engineering, life cycle management, and fleet 
usage” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 268), and sell the DLRs “at the cost of goods plus a 
surcharge to cover their operating expenses” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 268). 
b. Consumables 
Consumables, on the other hand, require no turn-in. They are intended as 
single-use assets, although they can vary widely in cost. The Navy’s policy is to stock 
only those consumables in support of the net selected item management (SIM)/demand-
based item (DBI) program or where supply department storage space allows for any 
consumable that does not qualify for SIM/DBI (NAVSUP, 1997, §6170). Certain 
consumables are also included in the ship’s allowance lists if they are critical components 




as direct turnover (DTO) items (i.e., ordered as necessary by the requesting division and 
delivered via the supply department upon receipt). 
c. Allowance Lists 
Allowance lists identify each ship’s mix of repairables, consumables, and 
special tools necessary for normal sustained operations with their assigned onboard 
quantities. Allowance lists can be either unique to a specific ship or common to the class 
of ship and serve as the baseline allowance. For example, a ship’s allowances will be 
tailored to its particular weapons and engineering systems as each ship receives update 
packages or undergoes overhaul. Each ship’s allowances are collected and documented in 
a unified Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL). The COSAL serves a dual 
role as both a supply document and a technical document. As a supply document, the 
COSAL contains all the qualitative and quantitative information used to build the ship’s 
allowances to ensure the ship can achieve self-supported operations for an established 
period of time—set as 75 days for all surface ships (NAVSUP, 1997, §6003). As a 
technical document, the COSAL establishes the ship’s operating characteristics and 
provides a means to research technical manuals and equipment, component, and part 
breakdowns (NAVSUP, 1997, §2090). 
The COSAL categorizes the allowances as either Allowance Parts Lists 
(APLs) or Allowance Equipage Lists (AELs). APLs are specific to the individual 
equipment and associated onboard components (i.e., the package of necessary repair parts 
for each unique weapons system). AELs, on the other hand, are common to multiple 
systems; they include the special tools, consumables, and occasional repair parts 
necessary to maintain and operate a variety of mechanical, electrical, electronic, and 
ordnance systems (NAVSUP, 1997, §2093). 
2. Supply Effectiveness 
The Navy uses supply effectiveness to evaluate the supply department’s ability to 
satisfy materiel requests from its onboard stock. As such, supply effectiveness is an 




readiness. Supply effectiveness is subdivided into four measurements: gross 
effectiveness, net effectiveness, SIM/DBI effectiveness, and the not carried rate. 
a. Gross Effectiveness 
Gross effectiveness measures the ship’s ability to satisfy organic demand 
for all parts and is calculated as 
 




Gross effectiveness is the primary indicator of a ship’s allowance range; 
higher gross effectiveness is preferred. Low gross effectiveness is often the consequence 
of incomplete or inaccurate allowance lists, resulting in a lack of support for installed 
equipment or weapons systems (NAVSUP, 1997, §6860). The goal for gross 
effectiveness varies by ship type and TYCOM, but Naval Publication 485 (P-485; 
NAVSUP, 1997) establishes a benchmark of no less than 65%. 
b. Net Effectiveness 
Net effectiveness is a measure of the ship’s ability to satisfy organic 
demand from its allowance and is calculated as 
 
(# of ship's requirements satisfied from storeroom stock)
(# demands with an allowance)

 (2) 
Net effectiveness is the primary indicator of a ship’s allowance depth and 
reflects the supply department’s ability to quickly replenish its stock; higher net 
effectiveness is preferred. Low net effectiveness is often the consequence of infrequent or 
inadequate stock replenishments (NAVSUP, 1997, §6860). The goal for net effectiveness 
varies by ship type and TYCOM, but the P-485 (NAVSUP, 1997) establishes a 




The time frame for gross and net effectiveness can vary, but they are 
commonly used as monthly metrics. Figure 3 illustrates the calculations for gross and net 
effectiveness. Each numbered shape on the bottom row (below the horizontal dotted line) 
represents a single demand for a part—the requisition. Out of 12 total demands, six were 
storeroom allowance items captured in the ship’s COSAL, and five were satisfied from 
storeroom stock. Thus, gross effectiveness was 41.6% (5 issues ÷ 12 total demands), and 
net effectiveness was 83.3% (5 issues ÷ 6 storeroom allowance items). 
 
Figure 3.  Gross and Net Effectiveness Calculations 
The two remaining supply effectiveness measures are SIM/DBI 
effectiveness and the not carried rate. The SIM/DBI concept identifies the concentration 
of high-demand items from a relatively small proportion of inventory, with the intent to 
ensure greater replenishment visibility, more frequent inventory, and higher supply 




department to increase or decrease its allowances based on real-time demand. However, 
repair parts are assigned a set allowance that cannot be altered without formal approval 
from higher echelons (i.e., the TYCOM and NAVSUP WSS). As such, the SIM/DBI 
program is not applicable to repair parts, and net SIM/DBI effectiveness was not 
evaluated for this research project. 
The not carried rate measures the percentage of total demand for which 
there is no allowance. The not carried rate indicates the ability and effectiveness of 
shipboard allowances to support installed equipment and weapons systems (NAVSUP, 
1997, §6236). This measure evaluates the appropriateness of a ship’s COSAL with no 
regard for whether the ship is NWCF or end-use. Therefore, we did not evaluate the not 
carried rate for this research project. 
3. Operating Funds 
a. OPTAR 
Of the various types of OPTARs, the only OPTAR fund category (OFC) 
germane to this research project is OFC-20, supplies and equipage (S&E). OFC-20 is 
comprised of two subcategories: EMRM and Other. A ship’s OPTAR is funded from the 
same appropriation that funds fuel, port visit costs, pier services, and some TYCOM 
overhead expenses; only the portion controlled by the ship to buy parts is relevant to this 
study. Equipment Maintenance Related Material (EMRM) includes all repair parts and 
those repair-related consumables necessary for corrective and preventive organizational-
level maintenance. As such, all EMRM DTO requirements or issues from stock must 
refer to an associated APL or AEL. EMRM is also used to replenish repair parts to their 
allowance level on end-use funded ships. OFC-20 Other is used for all remaining 
obligations that do not qualify for EMRM; they do not have an associated APL or AEL. 
Common applications of Other are medical or dental supplies and services, damage 






The Navy provides NWCF ships with five unique budget project (BP) 
accounts and associated OPTAR grants in order to conduct reorders and replenish NWCF 
stock to their allowance levels. Because these BPs are NWCF stock funds, any charges 
incurred to replenish stock allowances are offset by the revenue gained by selling the 
parts, in that “the NWCF is reimbursed when material is issued” (NAVSUP, 1997, 
§9400). The five BPs are as follows: 
 BP 14: surface consumables 
 BP 28: DLA-furnished consumables 
 BP 34: aviation consumables 
 BP 81: surface DLRs 
 BP 85: aviation DLRs 
The gross and net effectiveness diagram in Figure 3 reinforces an 
important distinction between end-use and NWCF ships. The end-use funded ship spends 
its EMRM funding not only to fill its inventory allowances (the shaded area representing 
the COSAL) but also to purchase those assets that are not carried or not in stock (the 
dotted shapes in the requisition line). The NWCF ship on the other hand spends its 
EMRM funding only when the assets are demanded; i.e., those requisitions below the 
horizontal dotted line. The revolving BP accounts are used in lieu of EMRM funds to fill 
the NWCF ship’s inventory allowances within the COSAL. 
B. DATA SOURCES 
1. Continuous Monitoring Program 
To facilitate internal and external monitoring of supply effectiveness, CNSF 
implemented the Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP) on board all surface ships in 
2003. The CMP allows the supply department to extract the most critical supply 
department pulse points from a variety of databases and disseminate them to the 




monitor “their day-to-day operations and take action to investigate and correct business 
processes that effect [sic] CMP pulse point areas” (CNSF, 2008, §17501). Pulse points 
are color coded for at-a-glance assessment using a stoplight scale based on acceptable 
metrics values. The CMP extracts and collects data for four distinct supply department 
functions: S1 Stock Control (extractor program), S2 Food Service (extractor program), 
S3 Retail Operations (built-in extractor), and S4 Disbursing (manual website entry). Data 
frequency for S1, S2, and S3 are monthly, while S4 requires weekly and monthly inputs 
into the CMP database. 
For the purposes of this project, we focused on S1 Stock Control, which includes 
gross effectiveness, net effectiveness, reorder review dollar values, and reorder review 
counts. Under end-use funding, the ship reorders repair parts to replenish its allowances. 
The reorder review represents those EMRM allowance deficiencies that must be 
replenished using ship’s OPTAR. 
2. NWCF Reports 
The TYCOM maintains two reports specific to NWCF ships that collect S1 Stock 
Control data comparable to the end-use ships’ CMP reports. 
The first report is the NWCF COSAL Effectiveness Metrics report, providing a 
monthly snapshot of gross effectiveness and net effectiveness for NWCF ships. The 
second is the Deficiency To Requisitioning Objective (DEF-To-RO) report. The 
calculation of reorder values differs between NWCF and end-use funded ships. The DEF-
To-RO report provides a breakdown of all allowance deficiencies by BP (14, 28, 34, 81, 
and 85) and Allowance Type (AT) code (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). For the purposes of this 
project, we focused on the following BP/AT combinations: 
 BP 28/AT 1: DLA-furnished consumables listed as COSAL items 
 BP 81/AT 1: surface DLRs listed as COSAL items 
 BP 81/AT 4: non-COSAL surface DLRs stocked based on demand 
These three DEF-To-RO data combinations equate to the reorder review counts 




In lieu of the end-use ship’s CMP, the NWCF ship uses the Material Financial 
Control System (MFCS) to calculate and report supply effectiveness metrics. MFCS is a 
comprehensive financial system that integrates NWCF accounting functions with asset 
visibility and transaction reporting (Commander, Naval Air Forces [CNAF], 2006, 
§1003). The MFCS can be accessed both at sea and ashore to allow the ship and TYCOM 
to interface with WSS. 
3. Budget Reports 
All afloat supply departments capture and report OPTAR status using two 
recurring reports: the OPTAR Document Transmittal (TL) Report and Budget OPTAR 
Report (BOR). The TL provides an itemized listing of obligations, obligation 
adjustments, and cancellations for a designated reporting period. The frequency of TL 
submissions can vary based on the fleet commander or the TYCOM but is at minimum a 
weekly requirement across all commands. The BOR then provides a monthly summary of 
that period’s TLs with year-to-date OPTAR grants and remaining balances. TLs and 
BORs are submitted to DFAS and the appropriate TYCOM. The weekly CMP inputs 
capture data from the TLs, and the monthly CMP input captures data from the BOR. 
4. Relational Supply 
The Navy’s hardware and software system used to facilitate inventory and 
financial transactions onboard ships is called Relational Supply (R-Supply). Unit-Level 
R-Supply is used for all end-use inventory ships and Force Level R-Supply is used for all 
NWCF inventory ships. The aforementioned CMP, NWCF, and budget reports are 
extracted from R-Supply. 
5. 3-M Data 
All ships use the Navy’s Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) system to 
plan, manage, execute, and track maintenance in an efficient and standardized manner 




doing so, 3-M also captures those EMRM requirements necessary to perform 
maintenance, to include all repair parts and repair-related consumables. 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
We collected the following data over the course of this project to support our 
research: 
 CMP data for all CGs from January 2008 to December 2012 detailing each 
ship’s gross effectiveness, net effectiveness, reorder review count, reorder 
review value, and ship’s status by month. The final entry for Normandy 
was August 2008, corresponding with the transition from end-use to 
NWCF. 
 CMP data for all LHDs from January 2008 to December 2012 detailing 
each ship’s status by month. 
 CMP data for Normandy from May 2004 to December 2007 detailing 
Normandy’s gross effectiveness, net effectiveness, reorder review count, 
reorder review value, and ship’s status by month. 
 COSAL effectiveness metrics for all CNSF–East NWCF ships from 
October 2008 to December 2012 detailing each ship’s gross effectiveness 
and net effectiveness. 
 DEF-To-RO data for all CNSF–East NWCF ships from September 2009 
to December 2012 detailing each ship’s DEF-To-RO for all BPs and AT 
codes. 
 EMRM requisition listing for all CGs and LHDs from January 2008 to 
December 2012. 
 Monthly EMRM obligation amounts for all CGs and LHDs from January 
2008 to December 2012. 
 3-M system data consisting of all maintenance requisitions generated 









Our methodology was predicated on two comparisons: effectiveness as an 
indicator of supply readiness and EMRM obligations as an indicator of financial impact. 
A. SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS 
1. End-Use CGs vs. Normandy After NWCF Conversion 
We calculated average gross and net effectiveness during Normandy’s NWCF 
pilot project (September 2008 to September 2012) and compared it against all other CGs 
from January 2008 to December 2012. We also calculated a weighted average gross and 
net effectiveness based on the number of EMRM requisitions per month. Finally, we 
compared average gross and net effectiveness using a narrower timeframe to provide a 
consistent range of months: June 2009 to September 2012. 
2. NWCF LHDs vs. Normandy After NWCF Conversion 
We calculated average gross and net effectiveness during Normandy’s NWCF 
pilot project (September 2008 to September 2012) and compared it against all CNSF-East 
LHDs from October 2008 to December 2012. We also calculated a weighted average 
gross and net effectiveness based on the number of EMRM requisitions per month. 
Finally, we compared average gross and net effectiveness using a narrower timeframe to 
provide a consistent range of months: June 2009 to September 2012. 
3. Normandy Before and After NWCF Conversion 
We calculated the average gross and net effectiveness during Normandy’s NWCF 
pilot project (September 2008 to September 2012) to a comparable time period prior to 
the conversion (May 2004 to August 2008). Due to gaps in the data, we also compared 
average gross and net effectiveness using a narrower timeframe consisting of 42 months 





B. FINANCIAL IMPACT 
1. End-Use CGs vs. Normandy After NWCF Conversion 
We calculated average EMRM obligations per month during Normandy’s NWCF 
pilot project (September 2008 to December 2012) and compared it against all other CGs 
from January 2008 to December 2012. We also compared average EMRM obligations 
per month using a narrower timeframe to provide a consistent range of months: 
September 2008 to December 2012. 
2. NWCF LHDs vs. Normandy After NWCF Conversion 
We calculated average EMRM obligations per month during Normandy’s NWCF 
pilot project (September 2008 to December 2012) and compared it against all LHDs from 
January 2008 to December 2012. We also compared average EMRM obligations per 
month using a narrower timeframe to provide a consistent range of months: September 
2008 to December 2012. 
C. HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
After narrowing the timeframes, we developed hypotheses to test the differences 
between population means. Overall, we believed that Normandy’s supply effectiveness 
and EMRM obligation amounts would both improve during the NWCF pilot project. 
First, the onboard inventory would be more robust in that Normandy’s reorder ability 
would not be hindered by competing DTO requirements or OPTAR limitations. Second, 
EMRM OPTAR would be necessary only to issue repair parts out of inventory, while 
allowance levels would be replenished from the NWCF’s revolving BP accounts. 
We employed the Data Analysis add-ins available in Microsoft Excel to conduct 
the following hypothesis tests: 
 Hypothesis test 1: supply effectiveness on Normandy versus all other CGs 
during the NWCF pilot project; our preconceived hypothesis was that 




 Hypothesis test 2: supply effectiveness on Normandy versus all CNSF–
East LHDs during the NWCF pilot project; our preconceived hypothesis 
was that Normandy’s supply effectiveness would be comparable with the 
NWCF LHDs. 
 Hypothesis test 3: supply effectiveness on Normandy before and after the 
NWCF pilot project; our preconceived hypothesis was that Normandy’s 
supply effectiveness would be higher after the NWCF conversion. 
 Hypothesis test 4: EMRM obligations on Normandy versus all other CGs 
during the NWCF pilot project; our preconceived hypothesis was that 
Normandy’s EMRM obligations would be lower than the end-use CGs. 
 Hypothesis test 5: EMRM obligations on Normandy versus all LHDs 
during the NWCF pilot project; our preconceived hypothesis was that 
Normandy’s EMRM obligations would be lower than the NWCF LHDs. 
While both data populations are NWCF, the CG is the smaller ship in 
terms of size and displacement, resulting in fewer EMRM requirements. 
D. DATA ASSUMPTIONS AND AMPLIFICATION 
This section provides our assumptions and other such amplifying information as 
they apply to the methodology and analysis. 
1. General 
 Higher gross and net effectiveness are direct indicators of higher supply 
readiness, and thus overall ship’s readiness. 
 Lower EMRM obligations per month demonstrate a smaller financial 





 The weighted average gross and net effectiveness provide a more accurate 
reflection of supply readiness than the un-weighted monthly averages. The 
weighted monthly average was calculated as 
 (Effectiveness %  # EMRM Reqns)  (#  EMRM Reqns)    (3) 
 The following scenario demonstrates the weighted average formula: 
 Month A: 100% effectiveness with 10 requisitions  
(i.e., all requisitions satisfied from stock) 
 Month B: 50% effectiveness with 40 requisitions  
(i.e., 20 requisitions satisfied from stock) 
 Un-weighted average effectiveness: (100 + 50) ÷ 2 = 75% 
 Weighted average effectiveness: (10 + 20) ÷ (10 + 40) = 60% 
 The first CMP of the month represents the end-use ships’ official pulse 
point metrics. The supply department can run an unofficial CMP extract at 
any time but has between the first and fifth of each month to document the 
results for internal reports to the commanding officer and external reports 
to the TYCOM. 
 CMP offers six options with respect to ship’s status for the supply 
department to choose from when running the extractor. The first three 
options correspond to the ship’s in port maintenance periods: depot-level 
(D-Level), intermediate-level (I-Level), and organizational-level (O-
Level). The operational impact of the maintenance periods ranges from 
least restrictive at the O-Level to most restrictive at the D-Level, which is 
often synonymous with the shipyard period. The remaining three ship’s 





 We assumed the ship’s status as selected in CMP by the supply 
department was correct. For any blank or inconsistent entries however, we 
made our best judgment, using the months before and after or unofficial 
CMP submissions within the same month, to determine ship’s status. 
 Gross and net effectiveness percentages were discarded if ship’s 
maintenance precluded the supply department from issuing parts. During 
such times of depot-level maintenance, most supply effectiveness 
percentages were unavailable; however, we discarded the remaining gross 
and net effectiveness data if they were reported as 0%. 
2. Normandy Pilot Project 
 The NWCF Pilot Project began in August 2008 when the ship’s existing 
inventory was capitalized. The September 2008 reports capture the first 
month of the NWCF transition. 
 Normandy entered a shipyard period subsequent to the NWCF transition, 
from which time no supply effectiveness data are available. The gross and 










A. SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Normandy Compared to Other End-Use and NWCF Ships 
We compared Normandy to other end-use CGs and NWCF LHDs during the same 
time periods, examining supply effectiveness, reorder review, and EMRM obligations. 
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of Normandy to all other CGs and CNSF–East LHDs 
with respect to gross effectiveness and net effectiveness. We calculated effectiveness 
using both an average per month and a weighted average based on the number of EMRM 
obligations per month. All subsequent effectiveness metrics in this section assume the 
weighted average, in that it provides a more accurate reflection of supply readiness when 
comparing across ships. During this time period, Normandy was an end-use funded ship 
from January to August 2008, a small sample size of eight months compared to the 52 
months as an NWCF ship. 
The highest net effectiveness occurred among CGs, followed by Normandy 
second and the LHDs third. CGs also had the highest gross effectiveness, but Normandy 
was lowest behind the LHDs. 
Table 1.   Supply Effectiveness: All CGs and CNSF-East LHDs 
 
 
Normandy All Other CGs Normandy CNSL LHDs
Sample Size, Months (n) 8 1172 42 201
Gross Effectiveness 54.32% 53.13% 35.27% 42.46%
Net Effectiveness 88.05% 81.12% 76.38% 70.92%
Gross Effectiveness 53.41% 54.05% 35.31% 40.01%
Net Effectiveness 86.62% 81.89% 75.12% 69.01%
Weighted Average: ∑(Effectiveness % × EMRM Reqns) ÷ ∑(EMRM Reqns)






We also examined the impact of ship’s status on supply effectiveness. Table 2 
summarizes our findings showing the D, I, and O-level maintenance periods aggregated 
as a single comprehensive maintenance period. Figures 4 and 5 graph the comparisons as 
alternate representations. 
For end-use funded ships, there is a positive trend towards higher effectiveness as 
the ship transitions from the maintenance period to POM, local operations, and ultimately 
deployment where they achieve the highest effectiveness. The trend for NWCF ships is 
more erratic but again demonstrates higher effectiveness when the ship deploys. 
Table 2.   Supply Effectiveness and Ship’s Status 
 
 
End-Use NWCF End-Use NWCF End-Use NWCF End-Use NWCF
Maint Period 74.93% 63.71% 47.06% 39.69% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
POM 77.53% 72.13% 47.99% 37.53% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Local Ops 79.97% 69.77% 51.60% 38.21% 86.62% 77.11% 53.41% 36.20%
Deployed 86.62% 70.73% 59.63% 45.43% #DIV/0! 69.48% #DIV/0! 32.77%
All Ships (Excluding Normandy) Normandy





Figure 4.  Supply Effectiveness and Ship’s Status (A) 
 








































We compared Normandy’s average supply effectiveness to all other CGs before 
and after the NWCF conversion, specifically, from January to August 2008 (before) and 
September 2008 to December 2012 (after). The results in Table 3 reveal that Normandy’s 
net effectiveness was consistent with the larger population of CGs prior to the pilot 
project, with a difference of only 0.26%. Normandy’s gross effectiveness on the other 
hand was 7.31% lower than all other CGs. After the NWCF conversion, Normandy’s net 
effectiveness was 6.07% lower than all other CGs, and gross effectiveness was 17.69% 
lower. We subtracted the differences in supply effectiveness before and after the 
conversion to calculate a combined marginal difference. Normandy’s net effectiveness 
had a 6.33% marginal decrease, and gross effectiveness had a 10.38% marginal decrease. 
Table 3.   Supply Effectiveness (All CGs) Before and After NWCF Pilot Project 
 
 
Finally, we compared the average supply effectiveness by calendar year for all 
CGs during Normandy’s NWCF pilot project. Figure 6 demonstrates the Normandy’s 
supply effectiveness improved significantly in 2011, the third full year of the pilot 
project, while all other CGs declined. In fact, Normandy’s net effectiveness outperformed 





Months of Data 8 52
Avg Net, Normandy 86.62% 75.12%
Avg Net, All Other CGs 86.36% 81.19%
Avg Gross, Normandy 53.41% 35.31%





Figure 6.  Supply Effectiveness (All CGs) During NWCF Pilot Project 
a. Hypothesis Test 1: Normandy vs. All Other CGs 
The first hypothesis test was between Normandy and all other CGs from 
June 2009 to September 2012. During this time period, Normandy had 40 months of data 
while all other CGs had 774 months. The hypothesis test results in Figures 13 and 14 (see 
Appendix A) reveal that Normandy’s gross effectiveness was different than all other CGs 
(two-sample t-test, p two-tail < .05); moreover, Normandy’s gross effectiveness was 
actually lower (35.69%) than all other CGs (50.28%) (two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05). 
However, there is not enough evidence to confirm that Normandy’s net effectiveness 
(76.94%) was different than all other CGs (78.75%) (two-sample t-test, p two-tail > .05). 
Both results are inconsistent with our preconceived hypothesis that Normandy’s supply 
effectiveness under NWCF would be higher than the end-use CGs. 
b. Hypothesis Test 2: Normandy vs. All CNSF-East LHDs 
The second hypothesis test was between Normandy and all CNSF–East 




months of data while all CNSF–East LHDs had 157 months. The hypothesis test results 
in Figures 15 and 16 (see Appendix A) reveal that Normandy’s gross effectiveness and 
net effectiveness were different than all CNSF-East LHDs (two-sample t-test, p two-tail < 
.05). Indeed, Normandy’s net effectiveness was greater (76.94%) than all CNSF–East 
LHDs (70.92%) (two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05), while gross effectiveness was lower 
(35.69%) than all CNSF–East LHDs (40.62%) (two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05). Both 
results are inconsistent with our preconceived hypothesis that Normandy’s supply 
effectiveness under NWCF would be comparable with the NWCF LHDs. 
2. Normandy Before and After NWCF Conversion 
We compared Normandy both before and after the NWCF pilot project to evaluate 
the impact on supply effectiveness. We selected May 2004 as the start date to provide an 
equal number of months (52) both before and after the NWCF conversion; however, 
effectiveness percentages were not available for all months. This was particularly true 
during Normandy’s shipyard period immediately after the NWCF conversion. 
From May 2004 to December 2012, Normandy’s average supply effectiveness was 
higher as an end-use ship prior to the NWCF pilot project, as summarized in Figure 7. 
 




We also examined the impact of ship’s status on Normandy’s supply effectiveness 
before and after the NWCF conversion, as summarized in Figure 8. As an end-use ship, 
Normandy’s supply effectiveness improved when the ship deployed. During the NWCF 
pilot project, however, gross effectiveness remained constant during deployment while 
net effectiveness declined. The weighted averages discussed earlier revealed that gross 
and net effectiveness both declined during deployment. 
 
Figure 8.  Normandy Supply Effectiveness and Ship’s Status 
(May 2004 to December 2012) 
Figure 9 provides a month-by-month comparison of supply effectiveness, with 
August 2008 representing the final month as an end-use ship. Normandy’s shipyard 
period after the NWCF conversion is clearly visible as an immediate decline followed by 
several months of inactivity when no supply effectiveness metrics were available. 





Figure 9.  Normandy Supply Effectiveness, Month-to-Month 
(May 2004 to December 2012) 
We isolated the data into the two distinct 52-month time periods to evaluate their 
respective linear trendlines. During Normandy’s end-use period from May 2004 to 
August 2008, gross effectiveness was constant while net effectiveness had a positive 
trend, albeit small. During Normandy’s NWCF pilot project from September 2008 to 
December 2012, gross and net effectiveness both had a positive trend after the interstitial 
period, with net effectiveness improving at the higher rate. 
a. Control Charts 
The month-to-month supply effectiveness results in Figure 9 revealed a 
wide range of values–both favorable and unfavorable. We developed control charts to 
assess and compare the variation before and after the NWCF pilot project. In doing so, 
we determined when supply effectiveness was in-control and out-of-control by 
















































































































































We limited the sample sizes to only those dates with consecutive supply 
effectiveness data and a consistent range of samples. For the NWCF period, we used the 
40 consecutive months from June 2009 to September 2012 after Normandy resumed her 
supply effectiveness reporting. For the end-use period, we used the 40 months prior to the 
conversion: May 2005 to August 2008. However, two months of the end-use period had 
no data, resulting in a sample of 38 months. Table 4 summarizes the control chart inputs 
and results. Note that the UCL of 104.55% for end-use net effectiveness was adjusted to 
100%. 
Table 4.   Normandy Control Chart Inputs (May05–Aug08/Jun09–Sep12) 
 
 
Figures 10 and 11 compare the 40-month net and gross effectiveness 
results superimposed over each other, with the end-use period’s control limits established 
as baseline. Those data points within the control limits represent common causes of 
variability, while those outside the control limits represent special causes indicative of an 
out-of-control process. During the NWCF pilot project, Normandy’s net effectiveness 
was out-of-control 40% of time, and gross effectiveness was out-of-control 60% of the 
time. By comparison, Normandy was out-of-control only 5.3% and 0.0% of the time, 
respectively, in the 40 months as an end-use funded ship prior to the conversion. 
mean samples Std Error UCL LCL
End-Use 89.85% 38 4.90% 104.55% 75.16%
NWCF 76.94% 40 6.66% 96.92% 56.96%
End-Use 62.34% 38 7.86% 85.92% 38.76%







Figure 10.  Normandy Control Chart, Net Effectiveness 
 




b. Hypothesis Test 3: Normandy End-Use vs. NWCF 
We developed a third hypothesis test to analyze Normandy’s supply 
effectiveness before and after the NWCF conversion as paired data. As such, we 
compared the 42 months of supply effectiveness data during the NWCF pilot project to 
the 42 most recent months of data during Normandy’s end-use period. The hypothesis test 
results in Figures 17 and 18 (see Appendix A) reveal that Normandy’s gross effectiveness 
and net effectiveness were different after the NWCF conversion (paired two-sample t-
test, p two-tail < .05). However, gross effectiveness was lower as an NWCF ship 
(35.27%) than as an end-use ship (62.12%) (paired two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05). 
Likewise, net effectiveness was lower as an NWCF ship (76.38%) than as an end-use 
ship (89.19%) (paired two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05). Both results are inconsistent 
with our preconceived hypothesis that Normandy’s supply effectiveness would be higher 
after the NWCF conversion. 
B. FINANCIAL IMPACT 
1. EMRM Obligations 
We compared Normandy’s average EMRM obligations per month with all other 
CGs and all LHDs. The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 5. From 
January 2008 to December 2012, Normandy on average spent less than both end-use 
funded CGs and NWCF LHDs. Again, we narrowed the data and developed hypotheses 
to test the differences between population means. 
Table 5.   EMRM Obligations per Month: All CGs and All LHDs 
  
 
Normandy All Other CGs Normandy All LHDs
$363,959 $463,748 $325,173 $387,222





a. Hypothesis Test 4: Normandy vs. All Other CGs 
The fourth hypothesis test was between Normandy and all other CGs from 
September 2008 to December 2012 to correspond with the NWCF pilot project. During 
this time period, Normandy had 52 months of data while all other CGs had 1,092 months. 
The hypothesis test results in Figure 19 (see Appendix A) reveal that Normandy’s 
average monthly EMRM obligations were lower ($325,173) than all other CGs 
($460,746)–a difference of $135,573 or 29.4% (two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05). These 
results are consistent with our preconceived hypothesis that Normandy’s EMRM 
obligations would be lower than the end-use CGs. 
b. Hypothesis Test 5: Normandy vs. All LHDs 
The fifth hypothesis test was between Normandy and all LHDs from 
September 2008 to December 2012 to correspond with the NWCF pilot project. During 
this time period, Normandy had 52 months of data while all LHDs had 354 months. The 
hypothesis test results in Figure 20 (see Appendix A) reveal that Normandy’s average 
monthly EMRM obligations were lower ($325,173) than all LHDs ($390,312)–a 
difference of $65,139 or 16.7% (two-sample t-test, p one-tail < .05); however, the 
difference is minor. The same results reveal that there is not enough evidence to confirm 
that Normandy’s average monthly EMRM obligations were different from all LHDs 
(two-sample t-test, p two-tail > .05). Nevertheless, these results are consistent with our 
preconceived hypothesis that Normandy’s EMRM obligations would be lower than the 
NWCF LHDs. 
2. Reorder Review 
We compared Normandy’s average reorder review (RoR) counts and values per 
month with all other CGs and all CNSF–East LHDs. The results of this comparison are 
summarized in Table 6. Normandy’s unadjusted averages during the NWCF pilot project 
were considerably higher than the CGs and LHDs (239 allowance deficiencies valued at 
$892,618). Upon closer review, we discovered that Normandy’s reorder review 




reporting after exiting the shipyard period. After removing these first six months of data, 
the average reorder review values per month decreased to a level more consistent with the 
CGs and LHDs (136 allowance deficiencies valued at $321,247). 
Table 6.   Reorder Review (RoR): All CGs and CNSF-East LHDs 
 
 
This comparison revealed a distinction between end-use funded and NWCF ships. 
The end-use funded supply department is incentivized to keep their reorder reviews as 
low as possible due to the CMP’s pulse point system–using ship’s EMRM OPTAR to 
effect reorders. Meanwhile, the NWCF supply department is subject to the revolving BP 
accounts and TYCOM involvement as to when and how much to reorder. Among the 
LHDs, reorder precedence is given to those ships on deployment or preparing to deploy, 
while nonoperational ships receive lower reorder priority.  
Normandy All Other CGs Normandy CNSL LHDs
EOM RoR Count: 38 108 239 167
136
EOM RoR Value: $66,693 $141,971 $892,618 $221,293
$321,247
Sep 09 - Dec 12Jan 08 - Dec 12
End-Use NWCF
First 6 months of NWCF conversion removed:








VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of this project was to identify whether there was a supply readiness or 
financial benefit gained by the type of inventory method used on small surface 
combatants. We began by defining the two methods used to fund spare parts inventories 
on Navy ships—NWCF and end-use. We provided a historical context for NWCF and 
highlighted a similar case detailing the costs and benefits of transitioning from NWCF to 
an end-use funding method. 
For our analysis, we obtained readiness metrics and EMRM obligation data from 
CNSF for all CGs and LHDs for the four-year period from 2008 to 2012. We used that 
data as a benchmark for Normandy’s supply effectiveness and OPTAR obligation 
requirements for the same time period. We also used Normandy’s data from the four year 
period before the pilot project, 2004 to 2008, to provide a before and after snapshot. The 
significance of analyzing Normandy data to LHDs during the pilot program was to 
provide a comparison of NWCF ships. The significance of analyzing Normandy to all 
other CGs was to provide a side-by-side comparison of two different inventory funding 
methods used on the same platform. 
At the beginning of the project, our original hypothesis was that we would see an 
improvement in Normandy’s supply effectiveness metrics under the NWCF inventory 
method, as well as compared to other CGs. The reason for improvement would be that 
onboard inventory availability would be more robust under NWCF, since EMRM budget 
limitations would not be a factor in ordering replacement parts. We also anticipated lower 
EMRM obligations under the NWCF method since EMRM funding would not be used to 
replenish inventory but only to issue repair parts for immediate use. We performed five 
hypothesis tests to identify whether the data provided statistical support for these ideas. 





Table 7.   Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
 
As of this research project’s completion date, Normandy still maintains its 
capitalized inventory, though the pilot project has officially run its course. CNSF–East is 
planning to de-capitalize the ship’s inventory and revert back to the end-use funding 
method before the end of its current maintenance availability in Fall 2013. The 
conversion would alleviate Normandy’s “Lone Ranger” status and reconstitute inventory, 
funding, and technical commonalities among all CNSF–East small combatant supply 
departments. 
B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We begin the discussion of our findings by examining the parallels between our 
research of inventory funding methods on ships and the existing research on funding 
methods of Navy shipyards explored in the Literature Review. Though there are 
differences between the two Working Capital Funds, industrial (shipyards) and stock 
(inventory) funds, the broad results of the research were comparable. Like the Cain and 
CBO analyses, we found that there are advantages and disadvantages to both funding 
Hypothesis Test Preconceived Hypothesis Outcome
# 1
 Supply effectiveness on 
Normandy vs. all other CGs 
during the NWCF pilot project
Normandy’s supply effectiveness 
higher than the end-use CGs
Not supported
# 2
 Supply effectiveness on 
Normandy vs. all CNSL LHDs 
during the NWCF pilot project
Normandy’s supply effectiveness 




 Supply effectiveness on 
Normandy before and after the 
NWCF pilot project
Normandy’s supply effectiveness 




 EMRM obligations on 
Normandy vs. all other CGs 
during the NWCF pilot project
Normandy’s EMRM obligations 
lower than the end-use CGs
Supported
# 5
 EMRM obligations on 
Normandy vs. all LHDs during 
the NWCF pilot project
Normandy’s EMRM obligations 





methods. More significantly, we identified that the preferred funding method is the one 
that possesses the most value in the criteria determined by the user. This can be likened to 
the popular notion that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. The strongest example of this 
in the naval shipyard research was in the area of financial flexibility. The Navy (end-
user) valued funding flexibility over total cost visibility in the shipyard operation. End-
use (mission) funding provided that level of flexibility over NWCF and therefore, end-
use was determined as the favorable funding method. Though NWCF provided greater 
cost visibility, the Navy placed a higher value on flexibility. 
Likewise, there are advantages and disadvantages in both funding methods for 
spare parts on Navy ships. We highlight our findings in eight key areas: supply 
effectiveness, financial, inventory levels, stakeholder impact, cultural shifts, training, 
shore support, and inventory pooling. In this section, we answer our first research 
question posed in Chapter I: Does a readiness or financial benefit exist when using a 
NWCF inventory method instead of an end-use inventory method? How does it affect the 
Navy, TYCOM, and individual unit? 
1. Supply Effectiveness 
The resulting analysis from the NWCF pilot project did not show an improvement 
in Normandy’s supply effectiveness metrics. In fact, Normandy’s gross and net 
effectiveness numbers actually declined under the NWCF inventory method. The data 
also showed that CGs had an overall higher level of effectiveness than LHDs. We 
determined that this disparity is due in part to the different versions of R-Supply with 
slightly different effectiveness calculations. When we calculated supply effectiveness 
from the raw 3-M data and compared it to the CMP metrics, we discovered that CMP is 
providing higher supply effectiveness numbers. NWCF ships do not use the CMP 
program in conjunction with R-Supply; instead, they use the MFCS to measure 
effectiveness. While Normandy’s effectiveness metrics were lower than all other CGs, 
they were higher than the LHDs. On average, neither CGs nor LHDs are meeting the 




demonstrated in Figure 12. The results are even worse for DLRs and FLRs when EMRM 
consumables are removed from the effectiveness calculations. 
 
Figure 12.  Supply Effectiveness, Reported vs. 3-M Raw Data 
2. Financial Impact 
During the NWCF pilot project, Normandy’s EMRM obligations were lower than 
the average of all other CGs and LHDs. This metric did meet our expectations. The 
primary differences between NWCF and end-use inventories are (1) the funding source, 
and (2) timing of the expenditure. End-use ships expend their funding to replenish those 
assets issued from their inventory or to purchase assets that are not onboard, either 
because they are not carried or not in stock. NWCF ships use their BP accounts to 
purchase inventory and use their EMRM funding to buy the part out of inventory. 
Therefore, they spend EMRM dollars only when a part is necessary for repair; their 




While this provides a savings to the TYCOM, it does not necessarily provide an 
overall savings to the Navy. The inventory still has to be purchased, albeit from another 
funding source. A primary advantage of NWCF is that there are no fiscal year limitations, 
whereas O&MN expires at the end of the fiscal year. Ships would not have to wait for 
end-of-year money to become available before they replenish their inventory 
deficiencies; rather, the ships can replenish them as required. 
3. Deficiency-to-Requisitioning Objective 
End-use ships are incentivized through CMP reporting to keep reorder review 
quantities and dollar values low when sufficient funding is available. When funding is not 
available, reorders are prioritized by operational needs. NWCF ships receive more 
oversight by the TYCOM, as managers of the BP accounts, and are not as heavily 
scrutinized on DEF-To-RO metrics. The TYCOM will prioritize reorders from the BP 
funding codes based on the ship’s training and deployment cycle, with reorder priority 
given to operational ships first. Therefore, DEF-To-RO metrics on NWCF ships are 
viewed more as an indicator of a ship’s inventory status rather than deficient inventory 
management. 
4. Impact to Ships, TYCOMs, and the Navy 
Table 8 summarizes our interpretation of the perceived  impact of each inventory 
funding method on the stakeholders: the ship, the TYCOM, and the Navy supply system. 
We assigned the perceived impact as being either favorable or unfavorable. In general, 





Table 8.   End-Use vs. NWCF: Impact to Ship, TYCOM, and NAVSUP/USN 
 
 
The end-use ship’s higher supply effectiveness benefits the ship and TYCOM 
alike as positive indicators of performance. Likewise, the NWCF ship’s lower OPTAR 
costs represent a more favorable use of ship and TYCOM resources. Because the end-use 
ship owns its inventory outright, it carries greater risk in that the ship’s COSAL may not 
reflect appropriate allowance range, depth, and composition. NAVSUP on the other hand 
is allowed to mitigate this risk by owning less inventory. The two inventory funding 
methods allow the TYCOMs different degrees of flexibility. NWCF allows the TYCOM 
to manage its revolving BP accounts and divert funds as necessary to support its more 
operational units, thus providing greater budget flexibility. However, end-use funding 
allows the TYCOM to shift its inventory assets between ships with ease, resulting in 
greater inventory flexibility. Finally, NWCF provides NAVSUP with complete asset 
visibility; they can see the assets’ locations and quantities in real-time. 
The raw tally of favorable versus unfavorable results gives a slight advantage to 
NWCF over end-use funding; however, we acknowledge that in reality the factors have 
different weights based on the decision-makers’ priorities. If greater priority is given to 
supply effectiveness for example, the balance may tip in favor of end-use funding. 
Ship TYCOM NAVSUP / USN
Supply Effectiveness Favorable Favorable -
Inventory Costs Unfavorable Unfavorable -
Inventory Risk Unfavorable - Favorable
Budget Flexibility - Unfavorable -
Inventory Flexibility - Favorable -
Asset Visibility - - Unfavorable
Ship TYCOM NAVSUP / USN
Supply Effectiveness Unfavorable Unfavorable -
Inventory Costs Favorable Favorable -
Inventory Risk Favorable - Unfavorable
Budget Flexibility - Favorable -
Inventory Flexibility - Unfavorable -






Likewise, if priority is given to lower inventory costs and budget flexibility at the 
customer level, NWCF becomes the preferred method. 
5. Cultural Issues 
We identified two primary cultural issues that contribute to the complexity of 
converting to a NWCF inventory method on small combatants. First are the perceptions 
of shipboard leadership, their understanding of inventory funding methods, and their 
willingness to accept changes in the business rules. Second are the norms and processes 
of how materiel is transferred among ships. 
a. Leadership 
One of the challenges mentioned in Normandy’s lessons learned was the 
funding paradigm shift for commanding officers and department heads. If a necessary 
part was in the onboard inventory but EMRM funding was not available, the CO would 
not want to hear that the supply department could not issue the part due to lack of funds. 
Under end-use funding, all onboard spare parts are owned by the ship and can be issued 
at any time. Under NWCF, the part needs to be purchased from the storeroom before it 
can be issued. Compounding this challenge is the fact that CG and DDG supply officers 
are usually an O-3, and the CO is an O-5 or O-6 with the factor of intimidation. This 
problem is not as prevalent on an LHD where the supply officer is closer in rank as an O-
5 and the CO is an O-6. 
b. Transfer of Materiel 
Both end-use and NWCF ships can provide parts to each other through a 
process called other supply officer (OSO) transfer. Since end-use ships own their 
inventory, the supply officer can choose to transfer a part being requested by another ship 
at their discretion, based on their ship’s anticipated requirements and their own goodwill. 
OSO transfers among end-use ships do not require a transfer of OPTAR funds and are 
considered “free issue.” While the part isn’t literally free, the TYCOM has already 




they transfer (CNSF, 2008, §5000). Similarly, transfers among NWCF ships don’t require 
funding, only the proper documentation to account for the stock movement. Transferring 
material from NWCF inventories may also require permission from the TYCOM or be 
directed via a cross-deck or referral message (CNAF, 2006, §808.2). 
However, the process changes when a NWCF and an end-use ship transfer 
parts to each other. When an end-use ship needs a part from a NWCF asset, they must 
provide a funding document, the same as if they ordered the part through the supply 
system. There is no “free” issue. When an end-use ship transfers a part to a NWCF ship, 
they relinquish a paid asset from their inventory, and the NWCF ship will usually order 
the replacement part to be delivered to the end-use ship. For these reasons, it is much 
more common for the NWCF ship to provide an asset to an end-use ship, as it is similar 
to the standard ordering process. The loss of “free issue” OSO transfer capability was 
cited as a disadvantage in Normandy’s lessons learned documents after the conversion. 
Not only did it make it extremely difficult to obtain parts from other CGs with whom 
they shared common weapons systems, but they also experienced a perceived loss of 
autonomy for inventory management. 
6. R-Supply Training 
One of the requirements to support a NWCF inventory is a conversion of the 
computer operating system used to track the onboard inventory and financial data from 
Unit-Level R-Supply to Force-Level R-Supply. The Force-Level system allows for 
greater interface with shore-based systems. While many of the components of these 
systems are similar, there are some significant differences that require additional training 
and experience. The quality of data in R-Supply is dependent upon the personnel using 
the system, which can influence performance metrics. At the time of Normandy’s 
conversion, personnel were not trained in Force-Level R-Supply, which created a 
learning curve for inventory management and reporting. 
Transitioning to NWCF provides a training advantage for shipboard logistics 




significantly reduce the learning curve when supply personnel report to ships on which 
they have no experience. This would also provide increased flexibility among the LS 
community and greater opportunities for technical proficiency among all platforms. 
7. Additional Shore-based Support 
NWCF assets have a higher level of oversight from the TYCOM, which is 
executed mostly by civilian contractors at the time of this report. The primary reason is to 
manage and distribute the BP dollars that are used to replenish the inventories on current 
NWCF ships (CVNs and LHDs). In a sense, they also share in the stewardship of 
NAVSUP’s assets, which requires an increased level of involvement in inventory 
management than would be required for an end-use ship. 
Therefore, converting all ship inventories to NWCF assets would require 
increased oversight and create the need for additional shore-based support at the 
TYCOM, be it contractors, government civilians, or sailors. This would require 
additional manpower in an already strained budget environment. At this time, we do not 
identify an offset where funding can be recaptured to pay for additional shore-based 
support. 
8. Inventory Redistribution and Pooling 
If all ship inventories were NWCF, inventory redistribution and pooling for 
excess materiel and ships entering maintenance periods would be more efficient. Assets 
could be reallocated as necessary throughout the fleet without the obstacles of working 
under two unique supply systems. The primary drawback would be a perceived loss of 
autonomy from end-use ships that “own” their inventories. However, TYCOMs would 
still be providing the direction, as they are now, with the same goal and intention for each 
ship to achieve its highest level of supply readiness. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section addresses the two remaining research questions posed in Chapter I. 




method? Second, is the NWCF inventory method a better option to use on future 
platforms that would traditionally fit the end-use funding method? 
In response to the first question, we recommend that CNSF utilize Normandy’s 
lessons learned and implement another NWCF pilot project under the following 
guidelines: 
 Utilize 3–4 ships to implement the pilot. This would allow for a larger 
sample of data as well as provide additional support for processes such as 
OSO transfers and redistribution of excess materiel. 
 Ensure all stock control personnel are proficient in the use of Force-Level 
R-Supply. This eliminates the issue of personnel learning curve adjusting 
to a new system. 
 Educate commanding officers and department heads about NWCF and the 
differences between the two types of funding prior to the conversion to 
ensure buy-in. 
 Develop a weighted means to capture and evaluate all key metrics, 
including those that are more qualitative than quantitative. 
 Capture and compare both EMRM and NWCF inventory costs to identify 
whether a financial benefit exists and to whom. 
Once the second pilot project is complete, if the Navy chooses to convert all small 
surface combatants to NWCF inventories, we recommend a phased conversion schedule 
to correspond with the ships’ extended maintenance periods. A systematic conversion 
will preclude the NWCF from capitalizing all shipboard inventories at the same time and 
allow each ship the required TYCOM support. 
In response to the second question, we assert that future platforms, such as the 
new Zumwalt-class of destroyers (DDG 1000), transition to a NWCF inventory. Our 
recommendation is especially relevant to the DDG 1000 now that the planned number of 
ships has been reduced to three (U.S. Library of Congress, 2013, p. 53) as an afloat test 




implementing new IT systems such as Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and 
innovations in logistics technology. While manning reduction is not the primary goal for 
this implementation, NWCF does allow for more distance support and smart ship 
technologies. As new classes of ships come online, the NWCF inventory method will 
provide additional flexibility in shaping and implementing ship COSALs. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There were many avenues we could have explored in this research, but they 
would expand beyond the scope of our primary research question. Each of these topics 
builds on the concept of NWCF versus end-use inventories and can continue to build on 
the data generated by Normandy’s pilot project. 
 Evaluate the NWCF inventory method on Littoral Combat Ships 
(LCSs). The fleet implemented NWCF on LCS. Due to the minimal 
manning model of the platform, nearly all functions of a traditional stock 
control division on a ship are performed by an off-ship Logistics Support 
Team (LST). This includes all inventory and validity reports, material 
management, and financial reporting (United States Navy Afloat Training 
Group, 2011). The LST model is better suited to the use of Force-Level R-
Supply. We recommend evaluating the LCSs’ supply effectiveness 
metrics, EMRM financials, and BP-XX spending and comparing the 
results to Normandy’s pilot project and other small surface combatants. 
 Inventory losses for NWCF vs. end-use inventory methods. One of the 
critiques for NWCF inventories on small ships is the perception that stock 
will be used whether or not there is EMRM funding available. We suggest 
research be conducted to identify whether there is a greater loss of 
inventory integrity on NWCF ships versus end-use ships across the fleet. 
Losses can be measured in a variety of ways but would obviously need to 




 How effective are the gross and net supply effectiveness 
measurements? Our data suggests that gross and net supply effectiveness 
metrics, as they are defined today, may not be the optimal metrics to 
evaluate the supply system on ships. Determine whether there is a better 
way to evaluate inventory effectiveness as an indicator of supply 
readiness. Identify the best measurements to indicate successful inventory 
management. 
 Cost/benefit analysis of conversion from end-use to NWCF inventories 
for all Navy ships. The approximate inventory value of a CG is $15.5 
million. Create a projected schedule and total cost to convert all current 
end-use inventories to NWCF inventories. Include the cost of capitalizing 
new ships as they are brought online. Identify total cost savings (if any) to 
the TYCOMs and the effects on the Navy’s O&MN budget. 
 Cost/benefit analysis of using a single information technology (IT) 
system (such as Force-Level R-Supply or Navy ERP) on all Navy 
ships. Evaluate the costs and benefits of moving to a single IT system on 
Navy ships and having one training pipeline for LSs. We recommend the 
researchers also explore the use of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) as 
that single IT solution. Does the implementation of ERP necessitate the 





APPENDIX A.  HYPOTHESIS TEST RESULTS 
To test our hypotheses, we used the following step-by-step procedure to decide 
between those t-test s and F-tests available in the Microsoft Excel Data Analysis add-ins 
assuming a level of error of .05: 
 Evaluate population data as paired or not paired (i.e., dependent or 
independent of each other). 
 If population data is paired, use “t-Test: Paired Two Sample for 
Means” 
 P-value < .05: reject null hypothesis 
 P-value > .05: do not reject null hypothesis 
 If population data is not paired, use “F-Test Two-Sample for 
Variances” 
 P-value < .05: use “t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal 
Variances” 
 P-value < .05: reject null hypothesis 
 P-value > .05: do not reject null hypothesis 
 P-value > .05: use “t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal 
Variances” 
 P-value < .05: reject null hypothesis 
 P-value > .05: do not reject null hypothesis 
Hypothesis tests 1–4 compare Normandy to other end-use and NWCF ships for 
the same time period; therefore, the population data is not paired (i.e., independent of 
each other). On the other hand, hypothesis test 5 compares Normandy before and after the 





Figure 13.  Hypothesis Test 1: Gross Effectiveness, All CGs 






























Figure 14.  Hypothesis Test 1: Net Effectiveness, All CGs 






























Figure 15.  Hypothesis Test 2: Gross Effectiveness, CNSF-East NWCF 































Figure 16.  Hypothesis Test 2: Net Effectiveness, CNSF-East NWCF 






























Figure 17.  Hypothesis Test 3: Normandy Gross Effectiveness 
(January 2005 to September 2012) 
 
Figure 18.  Hypothesis Test 3: Normandy Net Effectiveness 



































Figure 19.  Hypothesis Test 4: EMRM Obligations, All CGs 






























Figure 20.  Hypothesis Test 5: EMRM Obligations, CNSF-East NWCF  





























APPENDIX B.  PUBLICATION DESCRIPTIONS 
NAVAL SUPPLY PUBLICATIONS 
The Naval Publication 485 (NAVSUP, 1997) is recognized as the afloat supply 
manual. The manual is every supply officer and LS’s “bible” to conducting business 
onboard ships. Volume I of the P-485 is an extremely detailed guide that delineates 
funding, requisitioning, and inventory procedures for the fleet, to name only a few. Users 
of the P-485 may be stationed on end-use funded or NWCF ships. The following section, 
taken from the P-485, discusses the policy on procuring inventory items. It clearly 
provides that there is a line to be drawn with regards to funding sources for shipboard 
inventories and that there is a way that those parts must be handled. For example, a user 
would find the following guidance: 
1. PROCUREMENT FROM END-USE AFLOAT ACTIVITIES. 
Emergency requisitions for Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) material 
submitted by SAC activities to end-use ships require special handling to 
ensure proper financial reporting and credit to the transferring ship’s Type 
Commander. The DD Form 1348 6-Part submitted to the issuing ship will 
contain a statement such as: This issue to be processed as a turn-in to a 
stores account and should not be included in your A or B summary. Credit 
for material transferred will be provided to your TYCOM. (NAVSUP, 
1997, §3821) 
This illustrates that while end-use ships and NWCF ships can transfer materiel to 
and from each other, the process requires a great deal of additional oversight to ensure 
that each type of ship retains equity in the transfer. 
The P-485 (NAVSUP, 1997) shows the additional knowledge, layers of 
administration, and follow-up that are required when working with both types of funding. 
NAVAL SURFACE FORCE GUIDANCE 
Small surface combatants and amphibious ships home-ported in the continental 
U.S. (CONUS) are under administrative control of Commander, Naval Surface Force 




(CNSF–West) and one on the East Coast (CNSF–East). Although the instructions and 
guidance for both coasts are the same, the two entities are funded separately. CNSF–West 
funds those ships home-ported in California, Washington, Hawaii, and Japan; CNSF–
East funds ships in Virginia, Florida, and the remainder of the East Coast. 
In this document, we refer to Commander, Naval Surface Force, as the TYCOM. 
Supply officers and personnel aboard these ships use CNSF Instruction 4400.1 (CNSF, 
2008), commonly referred to as the SURFSUP. Accordingly, “the SURFSUP contains the 
information and guidance for personnel engaged in supply operations under Commander 
Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) cognizant [sic]. This publication amplifies and 
supplements procedures for financial management and inventory control” (CNSF, 2008). 
It clarifies areas where TYCOM sets policy and is used to supplement the P-485 
(NAVSUP, 1997) and other publications. Most importantly, this document details 
reporting procedures for inventory, the ship’s budget, and overall performance goals for 
the supply department in the areas of inventory and financial management. 
NAVAL AIR FORCES GUIDANCE 
CVNs are governed by Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), and also contain 
East and West components that divide the funding. However, aircraft carriers are only a 
part of CNAF’s scope; CNAF is also responsible for all Navy aircraft in the Fleet. The 
Supply Instruction for CVN supply personnel is the Commander, Naval Air Forces 
Instruction 4440.2 (CNAF, 2006), commonly referred to as the Supply Operations 
Manual (SOM). The SOM also delineates reporting procedures for inventory, the ship’s 
budget, and performance goals. The majority of storeroom inventory on a CVN is owned 
by the NWCF; like the SURFSUP, the SOM details the procedures for transferring 
inventory to end-use funded ships. The SOM is used to reference elements of the NWCF 
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